The short version: tokens stay in the vault. Wallet shows end users metadata about their grants — never the tokens themselves.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.alterauth.com/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
What Wallet displays
| Visible to the end user | Visible to the app | Visible to Alter staff |
|---|---|---|
| Provider, scopes, expiry | Same | Same |
| Audit log of every API call | Same (in the app’s dashboard) | Same |
| Which agents accessed the user’s data | Same | Same |
| The actual OAuth tokens | No — tokens never leave the vault | No |
| Decrypted credentials | No | No |
How tokens are stored
When an end user authorizes an OAuth flow:- The provider’s tokens are encrypted and stored in a dedicated vault, separate from any app database.
- The app gets an opaque grant identifier that points to the credential. The app never sees the tokens themselves.
- When the app calls a third-party API, the Alter backend resolves the credential, signs the upstream call, and returns the response.
Authentication
Wallet sign-in goes through the identity provider the connecting app uses (Auth0, Clerk, Okta, etc.). Alter does not store passwords for end users; the IDP is the source of truth for end-user authentication, and Wallet trusts its JWT to identify the signed-in user. Whatever authentication factors the IDP enforces (SSO, MFA, hardware keys) apply to Wallet automatically.What revoking actually does
When an end user clicks Revoke on a grant:- The grant status flips to
revokedimmediately. - The associated credential is removed from the vault.
- Any in-flight API call from the app continues; the next call fails with a revocation error.
- A security audit row records who revoked, when, and from where (Wallet, SDK, or developer portal).
What apps cannot do
- Apps cannot read tokens, even with their own SDK key.
- Apps cannot bypass Wallet revocation by caching the token themselves — apps never had the token.
- An app cannot see another app’s grants for the same provider, even if the same end user authorized both apps.
What Alter cannot do
- Alter staff cannot decrypt vault contents on demand.
- Alter staff cannot impersonate an end user in Wallet. Wallet signs the user in via the IDP, and the IDP is the source of truth for “who is logged in.”
Reporting a concern
To report apparent misuse of credentials or unexpected agent activity in the audit log:- First: revoke the grant from Wallet. That immediately stops further access.
- Then: email [email protected] with the grant ID and a brief description. The team can pull operational logs to investigate.
See also
- Wallet overview
- Managing grants
- Reference → Architecture — the full security model.